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ABSTRACT. So far, T×W frames have been employed to provide a se-
mantics for a language of tense logic that includes a modal operator that
expresses historical necessity. The operator is defined in terms of quan-
tification over possible courses of events that satisfy a certain constraint,
namely, that of being alike up to a given point. However, a modal opera-
tor can as well be defined without placing that constraint. This paper out-
lines a T×W logic where an operator of the latter kind is used to express
the epistemic property of definiteness. Section 1 provides the theoretical
background. Sections 2 and 3 set out the semantics. Sections 4 and 5
show, drawing on established results, that there is a sound and complete
axiomatization of the logic outlined.
KEYWORDS: time, worlds, epistemic modality.
1. Introduction
This paper originates from some reflections on future contingents. Among those
who have attempted to provide a rigorous account of future contingents, there is
a widespread tendency to think that the most appropriate formal semantics for
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a tensed language involves branching time structures, that is, structures formed
by a set of times and a tree-like partial order defined on the set. This inclination
is fostered by two assumptions. One is that indeterminism entails branching,
that is, the conception according to which there is a plurality of possible courses
of events that overlap up to a certain point, the present. The other is that an
adequate account of the semantic properties of future contingents hinges on the
notion of determinacy, understood as truth in all possible courses of events. In a
branching time structure, overlapping possible courses of events are represented
as maximal linearly ordered subsets of times, and determinacy is expressed in
terms of truth at a time relative to all possible courses of events that include that
time1.
However, both assumptions might be rejected. Against the first it may be
argued that, at least on a plausible understanding of indeterminism, indetermin-
ism does not entail branching. If determinism is understood as the claim that
for any time, the state of the universe at that time is entailed by the state of the
universe at previous times together with the laws of nature, and indeterminism
is understood as the negation of that claim, then indeterminism is consistent
with a conception according to which possible courses of events do not overlap.
Possible futures may be conceived as parts of possible worlds that are wholly
distinct, rather than branches that depart from a common trunk2.
The second assumption may be questioned in at least two ways. In the first
place, it may be argued that any account of future contingents centred on the
notion of determinacy neglects a crucial distinction, namely, that between truth
and determinate truth. Suppose that the following sentence is uttered now
(1) It will rain
It is at least consistent to claim that (1) may be true even though it is not deter-
minately true, if it is true in the actual course of events but false in some other
possible course of events. Secondly, it may be argued that some of the facts that
the notion of determinacy is intended to capture in reality are epistemic facts,
1 The notion of branching time structure goes back to Kripke, see [9], pp. 27-29.
2 Hoefer considers a definition of indeterminism along these lines, see [5]. Lewis argues




hence that an account of them in terms of a formal representation of a state
of knowledge is preferable to one that depends on unnecessary metaphysical
assumptions. Consider the apparent difference between (1) and the following
sentence
(2) Either it will rain or it will not rain.
This difference can be explained epistemically as follows: now we are not able
to tell whether (1) is true because as far as we know (1) is true in some but not
in all possible courses of events. By contrast, we can confidently assert (2), as
(2) seems to be true in all possible courses of events3.
If the two assumptions are rejected, no strong motivation remains for re-
garding branching time structures as a privileged formal tool to deal with the
issue of future contingents. In particular, if the second assumption is rejected
on the basis of considerations about the epistemic nature of facts such as that
considered, there seems to be no reason to restrict attention to metaphysical in-
terpretations of formal semantics. This paper explores one of the alternative
routes. The model of time that will be outlined, the grid model, belongs to the
family of T×W semantics, and the interpretation of it that will be considered is
epistemic rather than metaphysical4.
2. The grid model
Let Φ be the set of propositional variables. Our language will be the smallest set
including Φ that is closed under composition by means of the propositional con-
nectives and the operators G, H and D. Its semantics is based on the following
definition.
DEFINITION 1. Let T and W be sets. A G -frame is a pair ￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈￿
that satisfies the following conditions.
1. For any w ∈W, Tw ⊆ T . For any w,w￿ ∈W such that w ￿= w￿, Tw∩Tw￿ = /0.
3 In [7] I argue for the distinction between truth and determinate truth.
4 The original formulation of T×W semantics is given by Thomason in [10]. The epistemic






FIG. 1: The grid of worlds and instants
2. For any w ∈W, <w is a linear order on Tw. A relation < on T is defined
accordingly: for any t, t ￿ ∈ T , t < t ￿ iff there is a w such that t, t ￿ ∈ Tw and
t <w t ￿.
3. ≈ is an equivalence relation on T such that (a) for any t ∈ T and w ∈W,
there is a unique t ￿ such that t ￿ ∈ Tw and t ≈ t ￿, (b) if t, t ￿ ∈ Tw, t ￿￿, t ￿￿￿ ∈
Tw￿ , t ≈ t ￿￿, t ￿ ≈ t ￿￿￿ and t <w t ￿, then t ￿￿ <w￿ t ￿￿￿.
From now on, Dn will abbreviate ‘definition n’, and Dn.m will abbreviate ‘clause
m of definition n’. The members of T are called times. The members of W are
called worlds. So from D1.1 and D1.2 it turns out that worlds are linearly or-
dered disjoint sets of times. This means that times are world-relative temporal
units, in that each time belongs at most to one world. The relation ≈ specified
in D1.3, by contrast, expresses the trans-world relation of “being at the same
time”, so induces a partition of times that is orthogonal to their chaining into
worlds. To make this clear, the equivalence classes of times determined by ≈
may be called “instants”, following the terminology adopted by Belnap, Perloff
and Xu in [1]. In figure 1, worlds are represented as straight vertical lines that
run parallel, whereas instants are represented as straight horizontal lines that
cut across them: for example, t and t ￿ belong to the same world, while t and t ￿￿
belong to the same instant.
DEFINITION 2. A G -structure is a triple ￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈,V ￿, where ￿{Tw,<w
}w∈W ,≈￿ is a G -frame and V is a function that assigns a truth-value to each
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formula α for any time t in the following way:
1. Vt(α) ∈ {1,0} for α ∈ Φ.
2. Vt(∼ α) = 1 iff Vt(α) = 0.
3. Vt(α ⊃ β ) = 1 iff Vt(α) = 0 or Vt(β ) = 1.
4. Vt(Gα) = 1 iff for every t ￿ such that t < t ￿, Vt ￿(α) = 1.
5. Vt(Hα) = 1 iff for every t ￿ such that t ￿ < t, Vt ￿(α) = 1.
6. Vt(Dα) = 1 iff for every t ￿ such that t ≈ t ￿, Vt ￿(α) = 1.
D2.1-D2.3 are standard. D2.4 and D2.5 specify the meaning of G and H, read as
‘henceforth’ and ‘hitherto’. D2.6 characterizes D, read as ‘definitely’. D differs
from G and H in a way that is easy to grasp visually. G and H ask you to move
along the vertical axis and go up or down on the same world, while D asks you
to move along the horizontal axis and go left and right on the same instant5.
Other symbols may be added to the language on the basis of D2. ∧ and ∨
depend on ∼ and ⊃ in the usual way. Two operators F and P may be defined in
terms of G and H as follows: Fα ≡∼ G ∼ α and Pα ≡∼ H ∼ α . Similarly, an
operator C may be defined in terms of D as follows: Cα ≡∼ D ∼ α . Truth in a
structure and validity are defined in the standard way:
DEFINITION 3. α is true in a G -structure iff for any t, Vt(α) = 1.
DEFINITION 4. α is valid, that is, |= α , iff α is true in all G -structures.
The semantics outlined is a kind of T×W semantics. In particular, the ver-
sion of T×W semantics that best suits the present purposes is that provided by
Kutschera in [11]. Kutschera defines a STW frame as a triple ￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈
,∼￿, where the first two terms satisfy the conditions specified in D1 and ∼ is an
equivalence relation that differs from ≈ in that it is designed to express historical
necessity. So G -frames are nothing but STW frames without that relation6.
5 A modal operator defined in terms of unrestricted quantification over worlds, like D, was
first considered by Di Maio and Zanardo in [2].
6 The letter S in STW stands for ‘separated’, to distinguish STW frames from standard
T×W frames as defined by Thomason in [10]. In [11], Kutschera shows that for every T×W
structure there is an equivalent STW structure, and vice versa, see p. 243.
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3. The epistemic interpretation
On the interpretation of the grid model that will be considered, times desig-
nate epistemically possible global states of affairs, and worlds are understood
as epistemically possible courses of events. The underlying thought is that, for
every sentence ‘p’ such that we are not in a position to know that p, there are
at least two worlds: one in which p and one in which it is not the case that p.
For example, today we are not in a position to know whether it will rain tomor-
row. So there are at least two worlds: one in which it rains tomorrow and one in
which it doesn’t.
The use of the expression ‘in a position to know’ presupposes that a mean-
ingful distinction can be drawn between knowing that p and being in a position
to know that p. Being in a position to know that p, like knowing that p, is fac-
tive: if one is in a position to know that p, then it is true that p. But the two
states are not exactly the same. While knowing that p entails being in a position
to know that p, being in a position to know that p does not entail knowing that
p: one may be in a position to know that p without knowing that p, just like one
may fail to see something that is in front of one’s eyes7.
Note that the differences between epistemically possible courses of events
are not limited to the future. For example, we are not in a position to know
whether the number of cats that slept inside the Colosseum on September 4th
1971 is even or odd. So there are at least two worlds: one in which that number
is even, the other in which that number is odd. The same goes for the present.
For example, we don’t know the exact location of a certain whale that is now
swimming in the ocean, so we are not able to discriminate between times that
differ as to the location of that whale. The absence of a unique present time is a
key feature of the grid model. In figure 1 there is no point that indicates where
you are. The reason is that you don’t know exactly where you are, in that you
don’t know which of the two worlds is your world. What allows you to locate
yourself on the diagram is a line rather than a point, that is, an instant.
On the epistemic interpretation, D expresses truth in all epistemically possi-
7 Williamson provides a characterization of the distinction along these lines, see [12], p. 95.
In any case, nothing substantial will depend on this distinction. The underlying thought of the
epistemic interpretation could equally be rephrased as follows: for every sentence ‘p’ such that




ble courses of events. To say that it is definitely the case that p is to say that one
is in a position to know that p. For example, the apparent difference between
(1) and (2) may be explained in terms of definiteness. Consider figure 1. If p is
true at t ￿ but false at t ￿￿￿, then DF p is false at t, while D(F p∨ ∼ F p) is true at t.
The operator C is construed accordingly. To say that one is in a position to
know that p is to say that every epistemically possible course of events is such
that p. Therefore, if one is not in a position to know that it is not the case that
p, then one is not in a position to exclude that p, that is, some epistemically
possible course of events is such that p.
4. Axiomatization
T×W logic has been shown to be complete under two axiomatizations. One
is the finite axiomatization adopted by Kutschera in [11], which includes the
irreflexivity rule introduced by Gabbay in [4]. The other is the infinite axiom-
atization adopted by Di Maio and Zanardo in [3], which is free from that rule.
The system outlined here follows Kutschera, for the completeness proof is sim-
pler with the irreflexivity rule. But a similar system could be constructed in
terms of the other axiomatization.
Let S be a system whose axioms include the standard propositional axioms
and the following:
A1 G(α ⊃ β )⊃ (Gα ⊃ Gβ )
A2 H(α ⊃ β )⊃ (Hα ⊃ Hβ )
A3 α ⊃ HFα
A4 α ⊃ GPα
A5 Gα ⊃ GGα
A6 Fα ⊃ G(Fα ∨α ∨Pα)
A7 Pα ⊃ H(Fα ∨α ∨Pα)
A8 Dα ⊃ α
A9 D(α ⊃ β )⊃ (Dα ⊃ Dβ )
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A10 Cα ⊃ DCα
A11 DGα ⊃ GDα
A12 DHα ⊃ HDα
A13 FDα ⊃ DFα
A14 PDα ⊃ DPα
A1-A7 are standard axioms of linear tense logic. A1-A2 state that distribution
holds for G and H. A3-A4 ensure that G and H depend on accessibility relations
that are converse to each other. A5 expresses the transitivity of <. A6 rules out
branching to the future, while A7 rules out branching to the past.
A8-A10 characterize D as a modal operator. A8 expresses a platitude, as
it amounts to saying that being in a position to know is factive. A9 is easily
justified. If one is in a position to know that if p then q and one is in a position
to know that p, then one must be in a position to know that q. For all that is
needed to get to the conclusion that q is to apply a valid rule of inference. A10
entails that if for all one knows it could be the case that p, then one is in a
position to know that for all one knows it could be the case that p. This is quite
plausible. Suppose that one is not in a position to know that it is not the case
that p. Then, presumably, the negation of p does not hold in all possible courses
of events in virtue of some logical principle, and one is in a position to know
that.
A11-A14 state a connection between G, H, F and P on the one hand, and D
on the other. According to A11, if it is knowable that from now on it will be the
case that p, then from now on it will be knowable that p. This is acceptable if
one thinks that the antecedent of the conditional is satisfied only for those truths
that hold at any time. For example, it is true at any time in every epistemically
possible course of events that if it rains then it rains. Thus, it is knowable that
from now on if it rains then it rains. But if so then the consequent is satisfied, that
is, from now on it will be knowable that if it rains then it rains. The motivation
for A12-A14 is similar.
Let ￿ stand for derivability in S. The rules of inference of S are the follow-
ing:
R1 If ￿ α ⊃ β and ￿ α , then ￿ β
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R2 If ￿ α , then ￿ Gα and ￿ Hα
R3 If ￿ α , then ￿ Dα
R4 If ￿ D(∼ p∧Gp) ⊃ α , then ￿ α , where p is a propositional variable that
does not occur in α
R1 is modus ponens, R2 is temporal generalization, while R3 amounts to the
rule of necessitation. R4 is the version of Gabbay’s irreflexivity rule used by
Kutschera.
5. Soundness and Completeness
S is sound. It is straightforward to verify that A1-A14 are valid and R1-R4
preserve validity. The completeness of S can be proved through the method used
by Kutschera for a system called TW. Kutschera defines STW systems as sets
of maximal consistent sets of formulas endowed with a relational structure, and
shows that STW systems induce STW structures. Thus, in order to prove that
TW is complete it suffices to show that for every formula that is not a theorem of
TW there is a STW system that includes its negation, for that in turn entails the
existence of a STW structure in which the formula is not true at some time. Here
a proof will be provided to the effect that STW systems induce G -structures. So
the completeness of S will be obtained in the same way, using von Kutschera’s
result about the existence of a STW system.
Let us grant Kutschera’s definition of STW systems. To abbreviate, ‘mcs’
will stand for ‘maximal consistent set of formulas’. The relation RG is defined as
follows: if S and S￿ are mcss, SRGS￿ iff G(S)⊆ S￿, where G(S) = {α : Gα ∈ S}.
The relations RH and RD are defined in similar way. If S and S￿ are mcss, SRHS￿
iff H(S) ⊆ S￿, where H(S) = {α : Hα ∈ S}. If S and S￿ are mcss, SRDS￿ iff
D(S) ⊆ S￿, where D(S) = {α : Dα ∈ S}. RG and RH are transitive, while RD is
an equivalence relation.
DEFINITION 5. A STW system is a pair ￿{St}t∈T ,{Tw}w∈W ￿ defined as follows.
1. W is set of indices.
2. The sets Tw are disjoint, and T is the union of them.
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3. For every t ∈ T , St is a mcs. Each t ∈ T has its own mcs, so if t ￿= t ￿ then
St ￿= St ￿ .
4. For every w ∈ W and t ∈ Tw, if Fα ∈ St then there is a t ￿ ∈ Tw such that
StRGSt ￿ and α ∈ St ￿ . The same goes for P and RH. The case of C and RD
is similar, but without the condition that t ￿ ∈ Tw.
5. For every t, t ￿ ∈ Tw, either St = St ￿ or StRGSt ￿ or St ￿RGSt .
6. For every t ∈ T and for some propositional variable p, D(∼ p∧Gp)∈ St .
7. For every w,w￿ ∈W and every t ∈ Tw, there is a t ￿ ∈ Tw￿ such that StRDSt ￿ .
Let it be granted that t <w t ￿ iff t, t ￿ ∈ Tw and StRGSt ￿ , and that t ≈ t ￿ iff StRDSt ￿ .
Now it will be shown that for every STW system there is a correspondent G -
structure.
THEOREM 1. If ￿{St}t∈T ,{Tw}w∈W ￿ is a STW system, then ￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈￿
is a G -frame.
PROOF. D1.1 follows from D5.2. D1.2 follows from D5.5. To see that D1.3
is satisfied, consider condition (a) first. The existence of t ￿ is entailed by D5.7.
The uniqueness of t ￿ is shown as follows. Suppose that t, t ￿ ∈ Tw and t ≈ t ￿. From
D5.5 we get that either St = St ￿ or StRGSt ￿ or St ￿RGSt . But the second disjunct
cannot hold, because from D5.6 we get that Gp ∈ St , hence that p ∈ St ￿ . Since
we also have that D ∼ p ∈ St , hence that ∼ p ∈ St ￿ because t ≈ t ￿, we get that
both p ∈ St ￿ and ∼ p ∈ St ￿ , which contradicts D5.3. A similar reasoning shows
that the third disjunct cannot hold. Therefore, St = St ￿ .
Now consider condition (b). Suppose that t, t ￿ ∈ Tw, t ￿￿, t ￿￿￿ ∈ Tw￿ , StRDSt ￿￿ ,
St ￿RDSt ￿￿￿ and StRGSt ￿ . From D5.5 we get that either St ￿￿ = St ￿￿￿ or St ￿￿RGSt ￿￿￿ or
St ￿￿￿RGSt ￿￿ . But the first disjunct cannot hold. D5.6 entails that D(∼ p∧Gp) ∈
St , hence that ∼ p ∈ St ￿￿ . Since we also have that DGp ∈ St , A11 entails that
GDp ∈ St , hence that Dp ∈ St ￿ and consequently that p ∈ St ￿￿￿ . Therefore, the
first disjunct contradicts D5.3. The third disjunct leads to a similar conclusion.
For D5.6 entails that D(∼ p∧Gp) ∈ St , hence that ∼ p ∈ St ￿￿ . Since D5.6, in
combination with A5, also entails that DGGp ∈ St , by A11 we get that GDGp ∈
St , and consequently that DGp ∈ St ￿ . Since St ￿RDSt ￿￿￿ , it follows that Gp ∈ St ￿￿￿ .
So if it were the case that St ￿￿￿RGSt ￿￿ , we would get that p ∈ St ￿￿ . Therefore,
St ￿￿RGSt ￿￿￿ .
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THEOREM 2. For each STW system ￿{St}t∈T ,{Tw}w∈W ￿ there is a G -structure
￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈,V ￿ such that, for every α , Vt(α) = 1 iff α ∈ St .
PROOF. Let ￿{St}t∈T ,{Tw}w∈W ￿ be a STW system. Theorem 1 entails that
￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈￿ is a G -frame. A function V can be defined on the frame
in accordance with D2, assuming that, for each α in Φ, Vt(α) = 1 iff α ∈ St .
This way it can be shown by induction on the complexity of α that for every α ,
Vt(α) = 1 iff α ∈ St . The case of ∼ α and α ⊃ β is trivial. Consider the case
of Gα . Let us assume that Vt(α) = 1 iff α ∈ St , and suppose that Vt(Gα) = 1.
From D2.4 we get that for t ￿ such that t < t ￿, Vt ￿(α) = 1. Since t < t ￿ iff StRGSt ￿ ,
Gα ∈ St if α ∈ St ￿ . So Gα ∈ St . Now suppose that Gα ∈ St . Since t < t ￿ iff
StRGSt ￿ , for every t ￿ such that t < t ￿ we get that α ∈ St ￿ , hence that Vt ￿(α) = 1.
So D2.4 entails that Vt(Gα) = 1. The case of Hα and Dα is similar. There-
fore, ￿{Tw,<w}w∈W ,≈,V ￿ is a G -structure such that, for every α , Vt(α) = 1 iff
α ∈ St .
Kutschera proves that if a formula is not a theorem of TW, there is a STW
system ￿{St}t∈T ,{Tw}w∈W ￿ such that for some t ∈ T , the negation of the formula
belongs to St . A similar result holds for S, that is,
THEOREM 3. If it is not the case that ￿ α , then there exists a STW system
￿{St}t∈T ,{Tw}w∈W ￿ such that for some t ∈ T , ∼ α ∈ St .
PROOF. In [11], pp. 246-247, Kutschera shows how theorem 3 can be proved
in two steps. First, Gabbay’s irreflexivity lemma can be used to show that if it is
not the case that ￿ α , then there is a set {St}t∈T that satisfies certain conditions
and a t0 such that ∼ α ∈ St0 (theorem 4.1). S is like TW in this respect, as it
includes the rule R4, which is required by the proof. Second, a STW system can
be constructed from {St}t∈T by defining a set of {Tw}w∈W (theorem 4.2). Again,
S is like TW in this respect, as it includes the axioms used in the proof.
THEOREM 4. If |= α then ￿ α .
PROOF. From theorems 2 and 3 it follows that if is not the case that ￿ α , then
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